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INTRODUCTION 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AT A CROSSROADS: 
REFLECTING ON FIFTY YEARS OF VOTING RIGHTS  
AND THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF  
THE POLITICAL THICKET 
FRANITA TOLSON* 
 The fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 presents 
an opportunity to reflect, not only on what the U.S. Supreme Court has 
done in the area of election law, but also to chart a path forward. This 
symposium issue, which includes contributions from some of the best 
and brightest scholars in the field,1 reflects on the aspirations, ideals, 
and goals of our political system after five decades of meaningful vot-
ing rights and political participation. The substantive critiques and 
proposals presented by each author are especially timely given that we 
are in the midst of a presidential election year that has forced the av-
erage American to confront the question of who we are as a polity. This 
question encompasses more than just asking who can vote and in what 
election; it also includes the contested issue of whether the rules and 
regulations governing our elections lead to the selection of individuals 
who best reflect our collective political identity.2  
 Despite the abstract nature of the question of how we should define 
the body politic, it is clear that this is the very issue that the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                 
 * Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights, Florida State University College  
of Law.  
 1. My sincerest thanks to Brian Barnes, Joshua Douglas, Michael D. Gilbert, Richard 
Hasen, Michael Herron, Steve Kolbert, Justin Levitt, Eugene Mazo, Michael Morley, Derek 
Muller, Michael Pitts, Daniel Smith, and Daniel Tokaji, all of whom contributed articles to 
the print issue of this symposium. I am also grateful to Kareem Crayton, Michael Kang, 
Ellen Katz, Garrick Pursley, Bertrall Ross, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, and Nicholas Stephanop-
oulos for their participation in the “live” version of this symposium. A special thanks and a 
huge shout out to Debo Adegbile, former Acting President and Director Counsel of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, for keynoting the event and inspiring everyone in attendance 
to “run a lap for Thurgood.” I am also indebted to Dean Donald Weidner for his generosity 
and unwavering support of this symposium from its infancy. You are the best, Dean Don! 
Last but not least, thanks to the members of the Florida State University Law Review for all 
of their excellent work on this issue.   
 2. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schwerdtfeger v. Husted, No. 16 CV-2346 (Ct. C.P. Franklin 
Cty. Ohio Civ. Div. 2016), https://mgtvwcmh.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/judge-fryes-final-
opinion.pdf (reinstating an Ohio law that allowed seventeen-year-olds to vote in the Ohio 
primary election if they will be eighteen by Election Day); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 
627, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (holding that Texas’ voter identification law violates section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitu-
tion), stay granted, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2014), vacatur denied, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2014), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
the section 2 violation but vacating and remanding on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ment claims). The Fifth Circuit recently decided to hear Veasey v. Abbott en banc. See Veasey 
v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 WL 929405 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2016). 
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Court has struggled with for more than half a century. In Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Court defined the polity as one of political equals, repre-
sented by elected officials who are responsive and indebted to all, not 
just some, voters. To further this principle of broad inclusion, the 
Court declared that all state legislative and congressional districts 
must be of equal population—one person, one vote.3 Similarly, in Har-
per v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court declared that, not 
only are we political equals, indistinguishable by wealth or class, but 
the State cannot adopt regulations that infringe on the fundamental 
right to cast a ballot.4 In many of the cases that followed Reynolds, 
Wesberry, and Harper, the Court strictly scrutinized state regulations 
that made it more difficult for individuals to have an effective and 
meaningful voice in the political process.5 Likewise, the Court upheld 
regulations that limited the amount of money in politics in order to 
prevent candidates from feeling beholden, not to the voters, but to the 
wealthy donor class.6 In doing so, the Court recognized that the undue 
influence of money in politics can be just as corrosive of individual po-
litical participation as outright restrictions on the right to vote itself.7    
 In embracing a more pluralistic view of our political system, the 
Court also gave Congress broad leeway to enact federal legislation that 
protected the right to vote. 8  In 1965, Congress passed the Voting 
Rights Act (“VRA” or “the Act”),9 which is one of the most successful 
federal civil rights statutes in history. The most controversial provi-
sions of the Act—sections 4(b) and 5—suspended all voting laws in cer-
tain jurisdictions, mostly in the deep South, and required that any 
changes be precleared with the federal government before going into 
effect.10 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld section 5 
of the Act on the grounds that the law was an appropriate means of 
                                                                                                                                 
 3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 7-9 (1964). 
 4. 383 U.S. 663, 665-66, 672 (1966) (applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on the right 
to vote). 
 5. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).  
 6. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395, 398 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 103-04, 108 (1976).  
 7. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). 
 8. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to vote as a fundamental interest, 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670, and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits abridgment or denial of 
the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV, § 1. Congress has the authority to enact legislation to enforce both of these 
Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 9. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered section of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2014)). 
 10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 4(b), 5 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303, 
10304 (Supp. II 2014)). 
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carrying out the objectives of the Fifteenth Amendment.11 Katzenbach 
recognized that unprecedented federal action was necessary to ensure 
that the right to vote was extended equally to all individuals; the VRA 
was therefore a foreseeable consequence of the southern states’ una-
pologetic denial of basic voting rights to African Americans.12 
 In subsequent decades, and with more conservative judicial ap-
pointments, the Court became less willing to adopt an interpretation 
of the right to vote that, in its view, unduly infringed on the states’ 
sovereignty over elections. To limit these federalism concerns, the 
Court altered the standard of review in voting rights cases from strict 
scrutiny to a balancing test that weighed “the asserted injury to the 
right to vote against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’ ”13 Notably, in Ander-
son v. Celebrezze, the Court used this balancing test to strike down a 
restrictive state law that limited the ability of presidential candidates 
to get on the Ohio ballot.14 In practice, the manner in which the Court 
applied the balancing test in Anderson was nearly identical to Harper’s 
strict scrutiny standard, but in later cases, the Court took advantage 
of the flexibility inherent in “balancing” so as to be more deferential to 
the states’ authority over elections.  
 In Burdick v. Takushi, for example, the Court was unwilling to 
closely scrutinize the State’s rationale for its ban on write-in voting, ac-
cepting at face value the State’s interest in “avoiding the possibility of 
unrestrained factionalism at the general election” without requiring 
proof that the write-in ban furthered this interest.15 Crawford v. Mar-
ion County Election Board, like Burdick, was also overly deferential to 
the State. In Crawford, the Court applied the Anderson balancing test 
in rejecting a claim that Indiana’s voter identification law unduly bur-
dened the right to vote,16 and the Court demanded very little evidence 
from Indiana to vindicate its interest in preventing voter fraud. 
 The Court’s retreat from broad protection for the right to vote coin-
cided with its increasing scrutiny of congressional efforts to enforce the 
mandates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In reviewing 
the constitutionality of federal civil rights legislation, the Court 
                                                                                                                                 
 11. 383 U.S. 301, 325, 337 (1966).  
 12. See id. at 310-15; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (striking down 
New York’s English literacy requirement to the extent that it was inconsistent with section 
4(e) of the VRA). 
 13. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (quoting Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
 14. 460 U.S. 780, 789, 806 (1983). 
 15. 504 U.S. at 439 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 
(1986)). But see id. at 448-49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State had failed to 
justify the ban “under any level of scrutiny” because the ban does not serve the State’s inter-
est in preventing sore loser candidacies). 
 16. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190, 209. 
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adopted the congruence-and-proportionality test, which requires that 
Congress establish a pattern of intentionally discriminatory behavior 
on the part of the states before it can legislate a remedy pursuant to 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 While it is unclear whether 
the Court will apply the congruence-and-proportionality test or take a 
broader view of congressional authority in assessing the constitution-
ality of federal legislation enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment,18 the Court has been increasingly receptive to the 
state sovereignty objections lodged against the VRA, circumscribing 
the Act’s reach in a series of decisions.19 
 The Court finally addressed the federalism issues head-on in 
Shelby County v. Holder, invalidating the coverage formula of section 
4(b) of the VRA because Congress relied on forty-year-old data and 
long-eradicated practices such as literacy tests and poll taxes in select-
ing the states that had to ask “permission to implement laws that they 
would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.”20 
Since the formula resulted in mostly southern jurisdictions being sub-
ject to the preclearance requirement, but not northern states that have 
equally problematic voting rights records, the Court held that section 
4(b) violated the constitutional principle that the states enjoy equal   
                                                                                                                                 
 17. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). To determine whether there 
is a fit between the remedy imposed by Congress and the evil to be addressed, the Court will 
first “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue,” and then 
the Court will “examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional . . . discrimination . . . .” Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 
368 (2001). 
 18. Although Congress originally enacted the VRA pursuant to its authority under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, it reauthorized various provisions of the Act under both the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments over the last four decades. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 
F.3d 848, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (granting petition 
for a writ of certiorari and acknowledging that the preclearance regime is based on dual 
sources of constitutional authority), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). The Court has yet to 
resolve this issue. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 n.1 (stating that Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), “guides [the Court’s]  
review under [the Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments in this case” although that  
decision never resolved whether the congruence and proportionality standard applies to Fif-
teenth Amendment claims).  
 19. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) 
(avoiding the constitutional question but suggesting that section 5 is potentially unconstitu-
tional on federalism grounds); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2009) (holding that 
the State was not obligated to protect a minority influence district where doing so would 
violate state law because minorities were less than fifty percent of the voting population in 
the district and therefore had no cognizable claim under the VRA); Reno v. Bossier Parish 
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (holding that the Department of Justice could not deny 
preclearance to a plan that was discriminatory but nonretrogressive because this would  
“exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already ex-
acts” (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999))). 
 20. 133 S. Ct. at 2624. 
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sovereignty.21 In its view, Congress did not build a sufficient record, 
based on current conditions, to justify legislation that distinguished 
between the sovereign states.22  
 Shelby County stands in marked contrast to a case that took an ex-
pansive view of congressional authority, decided just eleven days ear-
lier. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the Court held that 
the National Voter Registration Act preempted Arizona’s proof of citi-
zenship requirement that was a prerequisite for voter registration in 
all elections.23 But the Court’s concern about state power lurked in the 
background of the decision, and it used this pro-federal power opinion 
to vindicate state authority, holding that Congress’s power under the 
Elections Clause is limited to setting the “Times, Places, and Manner 
of holding elections” and confers no authority on Congress “to make or 
alter” voter qualifications.24 Instead, these qualifications are linked to 
the state franchise by various provisions of the Constitution, including 
Article I, Section 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment.25   
 Notably, concerns about state sovereignty have not extended into 
the area of campaign finance in recent years. In Citizens United v. 
FEC, the Court invalidated a federal law that prohibited corporations 
from engaging in independent expenditures to elect candidates for 
public office,26 and in the view of some commentators, ushered in an 
era of unlimited campaign spending. Citizens United was closely fol-
lowed by American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, which over-
turned a one hundred-year-old state ban on corporate spending on 
First Amendment grounds.27 These two decisions stand for the propo-
sition that the government’s goal to combat corruption, broadly de-
fined, and keep excessive amounts of money from distorting the polit-
ical marketplace are insufficient to justify infringing upon the First 
Amendment rights of corporations. Unlike the federal ban at issue in 
Citizens United, Montana’s ban was passed in response to actual, doc-
umented corruption in state politics, but this fact was not enough to 
persuade the Court to uphold the law.28  
                                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2629. 
 23. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258-60 (2013). 
 24. Id. at 2265 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
 25. Id. at 2267 (citing U.S. CONST. art 1 § 2, cl. 2). 
 26. 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 27. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).  
 28. See Michael T. Morley, Contingent Constitutionality, Legislative Facts, and Cam-
paign Finance Law, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679 (2016). As Professor Morley observed, the 
state likely did not show that “the evidence before the [Montana Supreme C]ourt was suffi-
cient to justify a prohibition on independent expenditures.” Id. at 712. Nonetheless, “If the 
[Supreme] Court wished to categorically preclude any governmental entity from limiting in-
dependent expenditures as a matter of law, without regard to the existence of extrinsic facts, 
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 More recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, worries about the First 
Amendment rights of donors led the Court to invalidate the aggregate 
contribution limits to national party and federal candidate commit-
tees.29 By adopting a very narrow view of the government’s authority 
to combat corruption in elections, all of these decisions stand in stark 
contrast to cases decided in the last twenty years that gave the gov-
ernment substantially more leeway to regulate contributions by indi-
viduals, coordinated spending by political parties, and independent ex-
penditures by corporations and unions. And, ironically enough, it is 
unclear that the campaign finance regulations that remain in place 
actually prevent corruption in any meaningful sense, 30  a fact that 
highlights the divide on the Court and in the legal scholarship about 
what effective campaign finance regulation should look like. 
 Given the limitations on their authority to determine how elections 
are financed, most states have used their power over voter qualifica-
tions, which is significantly broader in the wake of Shelby County, to 
sharply define and limit who can participate in elections.31 In the last 
few years alone, states have enacted dozens of laws that make it con-
siderably harder to vote,32 and courts have had to weigh in on the va-
lidity of these regulations, often on the eve of scheduled elections.33 
These newest restrictions on the right to vote raise fundamental ques-
tions about the law of democracy that we must confront if we hope to 
                                                                                                                                 
then it should have framed its conclusion . . . as a purely legal assertion, rather than a fac-
tually contingent holding.” Id. at 713-14.  
 29. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). 
 30. For example, one of the contributions to this symposium argues that the limitations 
on coordinated expenditures, upheld by the Court, violate the Constitution because they can 
be circumvented by sophisticated actors and do not prevent corruption. See Michael D. Gil-
bert & Brian Barnes, The Coordination Fallacy, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 399, 421 (2016). 
 31. See Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 575 (2016) (noting the “troublesome tendency” of states to apply 
a “cartoonish” version of the Voting Rights Act and view it “through the lens of a revisionist 
retrograde stereotype” by packing minorities into districts that dilute real minority political 
power, an approach which threatens the constitutionality of the Act).  
 32. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, North Carolina Exemplifies National Battle over Voting 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/north-carolina-
voting-rights-redistictricting-battles.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus& 
action=click&contentCollection=us&region=rank&module=package&version=high-
lights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront (discussing pending litigation against 
North Carolina’s voter identification law, various voting changes, and the gerrymandering 
of local races); see also Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Race, Shelby County, and the 
Voter Information Verification Act in North Carolina, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 468 (2016) 
(arguing that North Carolina’s omnibus voting legislation disproportionately affects African-
Americans, who utilize early voting, take advantage of pre-registration for sixteen and sev-
enteen year olds, and tend to lack the requisite identification needed to vote as compared to 
their white counterparts).  
 33. See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 
443-44 (2016) (arguing that courts should be willing to issue emergency stays to halt the 
implementation of laws that disenfranchise voters, even if the stay would effectuate a last 
minute change in election rules). 
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retain robust electoral participation across race, class, and gender 
lines: Has our political system become one in which the Supreme Court 
and Congress “govern” by crisis,34 or does Congress still have broad 
authority to address voting rights violations after Shelby County?35 
Are states trying to innovate in ways that result in better-run and bet-
ter-functioning elections,36 or are they simply making it harder to vote 
and to be a candidate for elected office?37 When a state government is 
unwilling or unable to pass nonpartisan election administration regu-
lations, do the citizens of a state have the power to address the ills of 
the political system directly?38 Have litigants learned from the lessons 
of the past in challenging the rules and regulations that govern state 
and federal elections in this new political environment?39 Are courts 
receptive to creative arguments and theories as we confront new chal-
lenges to the right to vote?40  
                                                                                                                                 
 34. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ending the manual recount of ballots 
cast in Florida for the 2000 presidential election on equal protection grounds); Hasen, supra 
note 33. 
 35. See Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. 
L. REV. 433 (2015) (arguing that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expands Congress’s 
authority to address voting rights violations pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
 36. See Joshua A. Douglas, A “Checklist Manifesto” for Election Day: How to Prevent 
Mistakes at the Polls, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 353 (2016) (proposing a checklist that poll work-
ers should follow in order to avoid Election Day errors that can lead to voter confusion and 
post-election litigation).  
 37. See Wendy R. Weiser & Erik Opsal, The State of Voting in 2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (June 17, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/state-voting-2014 (stating 
that, since 2010, twenty-two states have passed new voting restrictions); Herron & Smith, 
supra note 32. But see Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency 
Requirements from the Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611 (2016) (arguing 
that residency requirements help states run elections effectively by identifying the relevant 
constituency and also by ensuring that those who are elected are residents who have an 
incentive to further the policy preferences of their specific geographic district).  
 38. Compare Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652 (2015) (upholding an Arizona ballot initiative that delegated the state legislature’s au-
thority to draw congressional districts to an independent commission in order to address 
partisan gerrymandering), with Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and the Elections 
Clause, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (2016) (examining several historical sources, including 
congressional adjudication of election disputes, and concluding that the Elections Clause 
contains a nondelegation principle that prohibits voters from divesting the state legislature 
of the power to set the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections via direct democracy).  
 39. See Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741 (2016) (ar-
guing that the nonretrogression test of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which asks 
whether the proposed change has the purpose or effect of making minorities worse off than 
under the prior law, should be incorporated into litigation brought under Section 2 of the 
VRA, which prohibits any law that abridges the right to vote on the basis of race).  
 40. See Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (But First, 
Which One is the Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507 (2016) (pointing 
to the Nineteenth Amendment as a source of congressional power to combat election laws 
that have a disproportionate effect based on sex); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2016) (arguing that the balancing test that the Supreme Court cur-
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 The contributions to this symposium suggest answers to these ques-
tions and others, and lay the foundation for a discussion that must 
continue if we are to live in a more inclusive political system in which 
our elected officials are accountable to all voters.41 It is clear from both 
the caselaw and current political debates that this symposium oc-
curred at a time in which the law of democracy is at a crossroads, 
where it is unclear whether our polity will be defined by the progress 
that has been made or the significant gains that have been lost. Hope-
fully, the voters will have a starring role in a story that is still being 
written, a narrative that is based on broad inclusion and access in the 
political system for everyone.   
 
                                                                                                                                 
rently employs in assessing burdens on the right to vote must account for the close connec-
tion between voting and the First Amendment right of expressive association because many 
election rules make it difficult for political outsiders to join together and express their views).  
 41. Indeed, one of the basic principles of our system—one person, one vote—was under 
attack in a case that the Supreme Court decided this Term. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. 
Ct. 1120 (2016) (rejecting the plaintiff’s’ claim that the Constitution requires one person, one 
vote to be equalized based on registered voters and total population instead of just total 
population). 
